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Revisionism is really a propo-
nent of the structural status 
quo. 
John Dewey 
and the ploys -
of revisionism 
By Joe R. Burnett 
This article discusses some of the ploys wh ich might 
be used for arguing that John Dewey's social and political 
philosophy can be interpreted as an instance of needed 
revisionism in American thOught. 
What is meant, fi rst of all , by "revisionism?" What I 
shall take It to mean is the modern tendency to reinterpret 
so-called l iberal thinkers of roughly the first half of this 
century to show that they were In theory and/or practice 
illiberal. Specifically this would mean one or more of the 
following: that, while purporting or seeming to do other· 
wise, / 
(1) their work did not support any major structural 
shifts in the corporate democrac)pvhich prevailed 
during that time (and, indeed, this time); 
(2) they supported an elitism, if yet not the traditional 
one; and/or 
(3) they supported centralist social control of the 
great bulk of Americans-in short, they supported 
a formal or informal, centralized oligarchy. 
Dewey was the nation's major l iberal ph ilosopher 
during the period, and he probably had the greatest in· 
tellectual influence of any liberal thinker. He is a tempting 
target for revisionists. 
What it would take to show that' Dewey really was a 
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proponent of the structural status quo would be one or 
more of a number of things. One of these would be to 
show that his theoretical philosophy openly advocated the 
structural status quo. Another would be to show that the 
philosophy was so inconsistent or ambiguous that it 
could be used to almost any purpose. Still another would 
be that Dewey consistently took positions on practical 
issues which supported the structural status quo, even if 
his theory apparently required that he would act other· 
wise. 
Now I think Dewey's theory is under attack on all 
three grounds; but, I further think that the revisionists are 
not aware that they should keep the attacks separate, for 
the attacks require different sorts of evidence and argu· 
ment. 
It is easy (but probably wrong), for instance, to view a 
few specific practices of Dewey, conclude that his theory 
must necessarily justify such practices, anct then con· 
demn his theory. Or, it is easy (but wrong) to become im· 
patient with the scholarship necessary to fully grasp 
Dewey's socio-political philosophy, and "force" a ren· 
daring of it which leads to faulty interpretations of these 
practices. 
Herein I concentrate particularly, but not exclusively, 
on what it is necessary for a revisionist to take into ac· 
count i f he is to succeed in showing that Dewey's social 
and political philosophy or theory supports or even lends 
itself to corporate, elitist centralism. I do not think the 
revisionist can succeed, but let us look at the case. 
A Case in Revisionism 
Why might a revis ionist think he could succeed? If 
the critic approaches Dewey's philosophy with the idea 
that a political theory is basic to Dewey's or anyone's 
social philosophy, he might think so. Dewey's political 
philosophy, his theory of the forms of political power, will 
certainty appear wish}"'washy if that is all one looks to. 
With few exceptions, Dewey rooted his political theory In 
a social theory of democracy. This Is evident, although the 
reasons for it are not yet fully clear, in his early and middle 
works. There is, for Instance, the classic passage in De· 
mocracy and Education, In which he gives us the two crite· 
ria which he says can be "extracted" from instances of 
community: 
Now in any social group whatever .. . we find 
some interest in common, and we find a certain 
amount of Interaction and cooperative in· 
tercourse with other groups. From these two 
traits we derive our s tandard. How numerous 
and varied are the interests which are con· 
sciousty shared? How full and free is the In· 
terplay with other forms of association?' 
Many student newcomers-but not only they, ap· 
parently-to Dewey's thought sense a major problem 
here: they notice that the criteria do not specify majority 
rule, a canon of democratic political thought. Dewey him· 
self says that " ... democracy is more than a form of 
government; it is primarily a mode of associated l iving, of 
conjoint communicated living."' And this makes it fair to 
ask if there cannot be modes of democratic community or 
associated living which do not abide by majority rule. 
There obviously could be for Dewey; e.g., the family with 
parents dominant, the extended community and neigh· 
borhood with elders dominant, occupational and profes· 
sional groupings with knowledgeable and skilled crafts · 
people dominant. These ordinarily are not examples of 
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majority rule, but they can, if and when they are consistent 
with the criteria, be examples of democratic community. 
The c riteria simp ly are technically non-specific about po· 
l itica l forms. 
If again, one is looking for political forms or power 
systems as basic, it equally can be noted that the politica l 
form o f representative government is not explic i tly sanc· 
tloned. Obviously the criteria demand participation and 
openness, but the form is left unspecified. 
A third thing can mislead the unwary, and that Is 
Dewey's heavy emphasis upon inquiry, the method of in· 
telligence, and science. Not infrequently Dewey speaks of 
the mission o f science as being almos t necessarily cen-
tral to recons tructing a disintegrating American society. It 
is easy, and I think on a few occasions, warranted, to in· 
terpret him as meaning by "science" the body of scien· 
tists and/or the social institution of science. If one makes 
this leap, and it is a leap in the context of the corpus of his 
writing, it seems easy to conclude that Dewey is ad· 
vocating a scientific meritocracy. 
There is another possible source for the view that 
Dewey " really " did not countenance more than a mod· 
lcu m of participatory democracy. He sometimes speaks of 
the role of the citizen in a manner which seems curious ly 
unqualified to the ardent democrat. Thus, he writes !hat: 
The devotion of democracy to education is a 
familiar fact. The superficial explanatio n is that 
a government resting upon popular suffrage 
can not be successful unless those who elect 
and who obey their governors are educated. 
Since a democratic society repudiates the prin· 
c iple of external authority, It must find a sub· 
s titute in voluntary disposition and interest; 
these can be created only by education. ' 
"laissez Fa ire Liberalism" 
These, I thi nk, are the major ploys which can be used 
to argue that Dewey's theory really is not democratic in 
any new sense, but s imply ano ther rendering of classic, 
laisse z faire l iberal ism - this time with liberal intellectua ls 
replacing, as the elit e, the captains of industry and the 
o ther t raditional socio ·political interest groups of cor-
porate democracy. 
These arguments do not in fact "connect" with 
Dewey's theory, however. Perhaps the most striking way 
of showing this is by giving his arg uments agains t making 
absolute such political devices as majority rule and rep-
resentative government. 
About the latter, Dewey maintains that it suggests or 
" contains about all that is relevant to political democ· 
racy."• But he views this political notion as having arisen 
out of the push and pull of people seeking immediate re· 
dress of felt wrongs or needs, rather than some cosmic 
sense of justice. The ethical defense o f the notion lies ra· 
ther in its use, under proper c ircumstances, for obtaining 
the quality and fact of community.' 
The argument which is relevant in the case o f rep· 
resentatlve government is most succinctly and c learly 
made by Dewey in the allied case of majority rule. It, like 
representative government, is one of the things he refers 
to as a political form of democracy, which was devised at a 
particular t ime in history to protect the values of com· 
munity. He refuses to make it anything more than that, an 
his torical provision, for fear that It, rather than what it is to 
protect, will become the important object. To do other· 
Winter. 1980 
wise would allow his philosophy to become a too l of what 
properly is called on occasion, "the tyranny of the 
majority." The more important thing is what comes before 
and after a vote: 
.. . antecedent debates, modifications of views 
to meet the opinions of minori ties, the relative 
satisfaction given the latter by the fact that it 
has had a chance and that next t ime it may be 
successful in becoming a majority .• 
In a word, what is more important than majori ty vote and 
majority rule is community before the fact of them and 
community afterwards! 
The emphasis upon, or de·emphasis of, majority rule 
and representative government as forms o f democracy, 
then, hardly suffices to question the centrality of the 
democratic notion in Dewey's philosophy.' 
What then of his emphasis upon science, the in· 
stitution and sc ientists? Do they represent a meritocratic 
class which merely is to substitu te for the businessmen· 
industrialist
s 
in a nonetheless centralized , corporate soci· 
ety? The question and its answers are so important to 
Dewey's social ph ilosophy that I shall not apologize for 
quoting at length. In his discussion of an ideal society, 
wh ich he referred to as the "Great Community," he did not 
foresee corporateness or centralizat ion which could (I.e., 
should) dictate life in decentralized communities. The 
Great Community, he said, 
... can never possess all the qualit ies which 
mark a loca l community. It wi ll do its f inal work 
in ordering the relat ions and enriching the ex· 
perience of loca l associations. The invasion 
and partial destruction of the life of the latter 
by outside uncontrolled agencies is the im· 
mediate source o f the instability , dislntegra · 
tion and restlessness which characterize the 
present epoch.' 
And, indeed, he traced part of the problem precisely to ex · 
perts: 
No government by experts in which the masses 
do not have the chance to inform the experts 
as to thei r needs can be anything but an ol igar· 
chy managed in the interests of the few .... 
The world has suffered more from leaders and 
!expert] authorities than from the masses.• 
Or again: 
Rule by an economic c lass may be d isguised 
from the masses; rule by experts could not be 
covered up. It cou ld be made to work only if the 
intellectuals became the willing tools of big 
economic interests. Otherwise they would 
have to ally themselves with the masses, and 
that implies, once more, a share in government 
by the latter.•• 
Or, still again: "A class of experts is inevitably so removed 
from common interests as to become a c lass with private 
interests and private knowledge, which in social matters 
is not knowledge at all."" 
Th is should put to rest the Idea that Dewey favored a 
centralized form of intervent ionist, governmental control. 
It 
should 
put to rest the idea o f corporate democracy. It 
should put to rest the idea of a meritocracy of experis or 
technocratic meritocracy. 
The fi nal part of this ploy, Dewey's occasional failure 
to qualify himsel f about the func tion of citizen deter· 
mination of rulers and " rules" is easy enough to dismiss 
3 
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as important in his total writings. Generally the qualifica-
tion of necessary citizen control is presenl if one will but 
pursue the discussion. In the instance c ited earlier, 
wherein Dewey speaks of those " who obey their gover· 
nors," one f inds the qualification eventuall y forthcoming: 
It is the aim of progressive education to take 
part in correcting unfair privilege and unfair 
deprivation, not to perpetuate them. Wherever 
social control means subordination to c lass 
authority, there is danger that industrial educa-
tion will be dominated by acceptance of the 
status quo. 12 
And, speaking of c i tizenship, he says there is a required 
" ... abil ity to judge men and measures wisely and to take 
a determining part in making as well as obeying laws." 
Even stronger statements can be found, although 
perhaps few in Democracy and Education. But, if we turn 
to his greatest work on social and polit ical philosophy, we 
read that, 
... the current has set steadily in one direc-
t ion : toward democratic forms. That govern-
ment exists to serve its community, and that 
this cannot be achieved unless the community 
itself shares in selecting i!S governors and 
determining their policies is a deposit of fact 
left, as far as we can see, permanently in the 
wake of doctrines and forms, however tran-
sitory the latter. They are nol the whole of lhe 
democratic idea, but they express it in Its 
political phase .... We have every reason to 
think that whatever changes may take place in 
existing democratic machinery, they will be of 
a sort to make the interest of the public a more 
supreme guide and criterion of governmental 
activity, and to enable the public to form and 
manifest its purposes still more authorita-
tively." 
This discussion of the ploy of attacking Dewey's so· 
cial and polit ical theory of democracy should not con · 
elude without emphasizing the point of departure which 
makes it mainly possible. I take that to be an erroneous 
construal of the poli tical aspect of Dewey's thought to 
primarily inform the social aspect. It works just the op-
posite for Dewey. The social concept of democracy is a 
necessary determinant of the political. Ullimately Dewey 
has his eye on the qualities of community associations 
i.vhich can meet the tvJo criteria \•1hich .were cited. Such 
qualit ies are not forms of democracy, they are the facts of 
democracy. As he says, 
Wherever there is conjoint activity whose con· 
sequences are appreciated as good by all 
singular persons who take part in it, and where 
the realization of the good is such as to effect 
an energetic desire and effort to sustain it In 
being just because it Is a good shared by all, 
there is in so far a community. This c lear con-
sciousness of a communal l ife, In all its im-
plications, constitutes the idea of democ-
racy. '3 
The political problem is to determine how, upon given 
occasions of difficulty, to effect this fact and conscious-
ness. 
Finally, before shifting the analy sis, one should recur 
to the notion of inqu iry or method of intell igence. A con-
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dition for democracy in his (and, one is sure, our) time was 
widely diffused abi l ity to be critically intell igent. The 
public requires this to rule itself , to select , inform, and 
judge thOse who will represent it. This is a necessity of the 
age, heavily determined by science, technology, and 
technolog ical-industr ial innovation. And, in this connec-
tion, one can say that it is a condition of the one form of 
democracy which does seem to be implicit In the social 
theory of democracy; viz., participatory democracy. To 
th is point we will return. 
Discussion Relevant to Literature 
As part of this paper, I want to criticize one particular 
analysis of Dewey's thought, partly to show that the above 
discussion is relevant to the current literature, and partly 
to show that one need not expect the three types of ploys 
to be so neatly iso lated as my initial statement might unin-
tentionally have suggested. 
The particular analysis is found in Walter Feinberg's, 
Reason and Rhetoric. Dewey is treated as one, although 
perhaps the central, figure in arguing a revisionist case; 
and, it is solely upon his analysis of Dewey that I con· 
centrate. That I find this analysis very seriously flawed 
shou ld not be taken to indicate anything pro or con about 
his general thesis or his analysis of other so-called liberal 
thinkers. The general thesis does, however, set the con-
text for the discussion cf Dewey. 
The major oversight of progressive reform was 
a fail ure to lully understand the Implications of 
its recognition that every social structure is an 
embodiment of a set of values and that the In-
stitutions in which these values are expressed 
have a strong influence on determining the 
desires and inclinations of the members of a 
society. Thus in§tead of a prolonged evaluation 
of the principles of social organization itself, 
the progressives insisted on evaluating in· 
stitutions merely on the basis of their lune· 
t ional integration." 
One would expect to f ind that Dewey was excepted 
from this "the major oversight of progressive reform;" for 
if there is anything evident (in the earl ier quotes, for exam'. 
pie) it is that Dewey did not make the mistake referred to 
by Feinberg. But Dewey is precisely the example chosen. 
Dewey, he writes, 
... merely denied that the social interest was 
best served by the business establishment and 
proposed that institutions be altered so as to 
free technology from its control. His alterna-
tive was to change the position of the science 
and engineering establishments for that of 
[the) business establ ishment assuming per-
haps that as the interest of science was served 
so too would be that of society. Yet li ke th  
laissez-faire theorist, no criteria other than func-
tional ones were established to judge whether 
or not the social interest was being served.'' 
The criteria of democracy and the concept of idealized 
community provide precisely the principles Feinberg says 
are lacking. Further, the whole notion of an eli tist 
m~ritocracy 
is, 
as we have seen, repugnant to Dewey. Still, 
Feinberg also cou ld write: 
Dewey was suggesting as d id Plato before him, 
that the intellectual's place was within the 
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power struc ture, guiding the politi cal leader-
ship in the governance o f soc iety. Unlike Plato, 
however, who felt there were definable limits 
under which such a ro le should be assumed, 
Dewey expressed no limit s, and no alterna· 
tives. 19 
Now all of this is sheer error: Dewey flatl y refu sed to 
make the functional arguments supplant his principles. 
Dewey's distinctions between social democracy (ethical 
and moral principles) and political democracy (forms of 
governing) Is spelled out most thoroughly in The Problems 
of Man, particularly in the last three chapters; but, cu" 
iously, this Is a volume to which Feinberg has no refer-
ence in Reason and Rhetoric, although he did make use 
of it in an earlier article which is partially incorporated In 
the book.'0 
If one looks more closely at Felnberg's account of 
Dewey, he finds some other curious things which deserve 
mention. For instance, in two quotations from Dewey, 
Feinberg supplies i talics without Indicati ng that he has 
done so. In the first case, I j udge that the effect is to make 
Dewey seem precisely to support fu nctional arrange· 
ments rather than democratic principles. On the latter of 
these two occasions Feinberg even repeats, apparently 
for emphasis, just the passage to which he has added the 
italics-emphasis, again not noting the italics are his, not 
Dewey's. I quote both passages. 
The Deweys' descriptive citation of the Gary 
School in Schools of Tomorrow provides some 
idea of the techniques that were avai lable for 
this purpose. 
They (the immigrant parents) are naturall y 
suspicious of Government and social 
authority ... and it is very Important that 
their children should have some real 
knowledge on which to base a sounder 
judgment. Besides giving them thi s, the 
schools try to teach American standards 
of l iving to the pupils and so their par· 
ents. On entering school every pupil 
gives the school office, besides the usual 
name, age, and address, certain lnfor· 
mation about his famil y, Its ize, Its re · 
sources, and the character of the home 
he lives in. This record Is kept in the 
school and transferred if the child moves 
out of the school district. ... By com· 
paring these with any family record, It Is a 
simple matter to tell if the famlly are [sic) 
living under proper moral and hygienic 
conditions .... If bad conditions are due 
to ignorance or poverty, the teacher f inds 
out what can be done to remedy them, 
and sees to It that the family learns how 
they can better themselves. If conditions 
are very bad, neighborhood public opln· 
Ion Is wor1<ed up through the children on 
the block.'' 
The second passage: Dewey reported 
.. . it is still possible for a scholar to speak out 
on the controversial side of an Issue If he ap· 
proaches the problem " in such an objective, 
historic, and constructive manner as not to ex· 
cite the prejudice or inflame the passion even 
of those who thoroughly disagree with him." 
The intent of the statement Is puzzling since 
Winter, 1980 
clearly issues of academic freedom will never 
arise if prejudice or passion are not inflamed. 
but its effect is to place the burden of proof on 
the academic style of the intellec tual dissenter 
even to the point of hold ing him responsible 
for the reactions of those "wh o thoroughly 
disagree with him." Presumab ly a passionate 
reaction was to be taken as evidence of some 
kind of deficiency in the presentation. After all. 
Dewey reminded his readers, the scholar 
"needs tact as well as scholarship."" 
Further, regarding this last passage, Feinberg does not 
note that Dewey goes on to qualify the importance and 
nature of " tact," Dewey saying that " ... ' tact ' suggests 
perhaps too much a kind of Juggling diplomacy with the 
questions at issue ."2 l 
There is another passage I think one must note, 
allho ugh there are others still." This one seems to 
"presume" on Dewey's intentions, however contrary to 
his democratic principles. In the context o f a discussion 
of Dewey's account ot evaluation and his eth ical theory, 
Feinberg says, 
Part of the appeal of Dewey's argument lies in 
its philosophical ambiguity. For not everyone 
would agree that ethical behavior and evo· 
lutionary progress are the same thing or that 
the latter should serve as the criterion for the 
former. Some would even fine peculi ar the 
suggestion that our most cherished acts o f 
alt ruism, such as caring for the old are bes t 
judged as preparations for war or other survival 
activi ty. If Dewey were putting lorth on ly a faC· 
tual claim, then all that could really be said is 
that at certain times in human his tory, there 
may be fortunate coincidences between eth · 
ical acts and evolutionary processes. But o f 
course this watered down claim did not really 
suit his purposes and it was useful for him to 
leave the ambiguous quality alone. On the 
other hand, to suggest outright that evolu· 
tionary survival was to be the criterion for ethl· 
cal activity would have been to provide some 
clear guidance as to how an ethical claim might 
be objectively judged. Yet precise ly because 
such a criterion can be cha llenged on o ther 
grounds, i t was again best for Dewey to allo w 
the ambiguity to stand. However, Dewey's 
claim does require some analysis." 
The passage.s in Dewey that are in question do not in· 
dicate to me that Dewey thought his best purposes would 
be served by ambiguity; indeed, this claim about what 
Dewey found " useful" and "best" seems merely to 
" po ison the well s" and prejudge the very analysis which, 
i t is c laimed, is needed. 
Three Ploys Illustrated 
Now I think that Feinberg 's analysis does illustrate 
the three ploys. There is the attack upon Dewey's theory 
of democracy, which does not work because of a faulty 
statement of that theory. There is the attempt to d iscredit 
the practice of Dewey as not genuinely lib eral or Clem· 
ocratic in a number of instances, a discrediting which does 
not seem convincing in the particular cases dealt with 
here. Finall y, there might be the suggestion that Dew· 
ey's theory is so confused or ambiguous that It could sup · 
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port about any twist and turn which Dewey wished to 
make. But, I find this unconvincing. 
wtiatever the case, any ploy of revisionism in Dew· 
ey's theoretica l thought has to start with a clear rec· 
ognition of what he fashioned in his mature social and 
political thought on democracy. One can refer to Platonic 
and Hegelian inf luences on the early and midd le·years of 
Dewey, but the "bottom line," as youth today are wont to 
say, for Dewey resides in the mature, The Public and Its 
Problems. Earlier I commented on the fact that one form 
of democracy seems to be implicit in his social con· 
ception of democracy. I deem It appropriate to quote him 
on that form, participatory democracy, as the bottom line 
of th is paper. Any charac terizat ion of him as a centralist, 
elitist advocate of corporate democracy will be most con-
vincing if it can deal with these words in their context: 
The ballot box and majority rule are external 
and very largely mechanical symbols and ex· 
pressions. They are expedients, the best 
devices that at a certain t ime have been found, 
but beneath them there are the two ideas: Ii rst, 
the opportunity, the right and the duty of every 
individual to form some conviction and ex· 
press some conviction regarding his own place 
in the social order, and the relations of that 
social order to his own welfare; second, the 
fact that each ind ividual counts as one and one 
only on an equality with others, so that the final 
social will comes about as the cooperative ex· 
pression of the ideas of many people. And I 
think it is perhaps only recently that we are 
real izing that (this) ... idea is the essence of all 
sound education." 
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"In one paragraph I wrote about Oev1ey's concern to have people 
be abfe 'to recognize themse lves as members of a community, 
each striving to enrich the l ives of all.' And I menlion that Dewey 
also believed that if ' the community \Vas to be a democratic one 
... its members \vere not to be manipulated from above:'' Fein· 
berg, "On Reading Dewey," p . 401. His reference is to p. 495 of his 
"Progressive Education and Social Planning," Teachers College 
Record, 73, 4 (May, 1972), pp. 486-605. He also notes Dewey's con-
cern i n Reason and Rhetoric. Bot what kind of a concern can he be 
saying it is that Oev1ey has, if he is convinced that De\vey e><.· 
pressed no limits and no alternatives to t he intellectuals' role in 
the power structure? One can take these tv10 contenUonsJ to 
paraphrase John Wisdom. to mean that v1hen Oev1ey said he really 
believed in democracy and community, he meant that he did not 
believe in democracy and community really. For De,vey·s equating 
of democracy and community, see the last quotation in Part II, 
herein. 
to He does not there make the very strong charge, above, 
about the role of experts, but he does say: " In the last analysis his 
[Dewey's) concern for scientific intelligence is a statement of the 
need for experts in a highly complex techn ological society, and 
his appeal for democratic consensus is an attempt to create a 
citizenry that is able to see the v1isdom of intelligence expertly 
exercised." Or, again: 
One factor that separated Progressive educators 
from others was an expressed concern for the well· 
being and integrity of Immigrant and racial minori · 
ties. At its best this concern mirrored the appeal fof 
diversity that v1as an expliclt part of Dewey's notion 
of community. At its worst it expressed the belief in 
experts, in authority, and in unity that wa.s hidden in 
that same notion of community. 
Walter Feinberg, "Progressive Education and Social Planning," 
pp. 485 and 496 respectively. 
t • Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 209·210. Italics are 
Feinberg's. Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., use substantially 
the same quote, ending v1ith the same sentence (not in italics this 
time) In another work. After the quotation they remark: " If any 
parent had doubts about the validity of their Instinc tive distrust of 
public authority, Oev1ey's description of the role of the teacher 
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v1ould surely have reassured them that their doubts v1ere firmly 
based in reality.'' ;·r eaching for the Welfare State/' in Walter Fein· 
berg and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (Eds.), Work, Technology, and 
Education (Urbana, Ill .: University of Ill inois Press. 1975), P.. 89. 1 do 
not think that this Is an obvious conclusion except t hat the 
quotation ends where it does: had the paragraph in v1hich it ap· 
pears been concluded, the readerv1ould have further read that: 
From time to time an auditorium period is devoted to 
showing these maps and pointing out the good and 
bad features of the blocks and neighborhoods. 
Children always carry the news home to their parents, 
and as rents and accommodation are freely dis· 
cussed, these reports are often acted upon. The 
parents are encouraged to come to the school and 
ask tor information, and on more than one occasion 
some newly arrived family has moved from an over· 
cro\vded rear shack to a comfortable flat with the 
same rent because through the children they found 
out that their bad quarters v1ere unnecessary. 
Because the school does this work to help, and as 
part of Its regular program. it is accepted by the 
children and thei r parents as a matter of course. In· 
formation about improvements. sanitation. the s ize 
and comfort of the houses, and the rents, is given to 
the parents. If a block is poor a good block nearby 
\Vhere cond itions are better and the rents the same, 
is shown them. Thus the schools not only teach the 
theory of good citizenship and social conditions, they 
give the chi ld ren actua l facts and condi tions, so that 
they can see v1hat is v1tong and how It can be bet· 
tered. 
The complete paragraph appears In John and Evelyn Dewey , 
Schools of Tomotrow, " Introduction" by Wi llia m Wolfgang Brick· 
man (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1962). pp. 147-148. 
n Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 228·229. Feinberg's 
i talics. 
n The exact sentence reads: " We may insis t thal a man 
needs tact as v1ell as scholarship; or, let us say, sympathy with 
human interests-since 'tact' suggests perhaps too much a k ind 
of juggling d iplomacy with the questions at issue." From John 
Dewey, "Academic Freedom," In Jo Ann Boydston (Ed.), John 
Dewey, The Middle Works: 1902·1 903 (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern 
Ill inois University Press, 1976), Vol. 2, p. 60. 
>' One of these is Feinberg's response to a passage i n 
Dewey's Impressions of Soviet Russia. Feinberg quotes Dewey as 
follov1s : 
Nowhere else in the \VOrld is employment of it (pro· 
paganda) as a tool of control so constant, consis· 
tent, and systematic as in Russia at present. In· 
deed, It has taken on such importance and social 
dignity that the word propaganda hardly carries, in 
another social medium. the correct meaning. For we 
instinctively associate propaganda with the ac· 
complishing of some specific ends, more or less 
private to a particular class or group and correspond· 
ingl
y concealed 
from others. But i n Russia the 
propaganda is In behalf of a burning public faith. One 
may believe that the leaders are wholly mistaken in 
the object of thei r faith, but their sincerity is beyond 
question. To them the end for ·which propaganda is 
employed is not a private or even a c lass gain, but is 
the universal good of universal humanity. In con · 
sequence propaganda is education and education Is 
propaganda. They are more than confounded; t hey 
are Identi cal. 
Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 207·208. Feinberg t hen says 
George S. Counts " expressed a similar sentiment a few years 
later.'' and quotes Counts to the effec t that, if progressive 
education is to "emancipate itself," it must " become less 
frightened t han it is today at the bogeys o f imposition and in· 
doctrlnall on." Feinberg then remarks that " The appeal that the 
early phases of the Soviet experiment held for these educators 
Winter. 1980 
was as much an indication of their essent ially managerial 
philosophy as it was an expression of their ideas on socia l 
justice." Ibid ., p. 208. 
I am indebted to Paul C. Violas for pointi ng out that Feinberg 
errs in quoting Dewey to the effect that "They (education and 
propaganda) are more than confounded; they are identical." 
De\vey uses the term " ide ntified ," not "identical," \Vhlch would 
make for a weaker case. De\vey eas ily could hold that the 
Russians could incorrectly make an identificatio n even i f the tv10 
are not iden tica l. John Dewey, Impressions of Soviet Russia (Ne\v 
York: The Nevi Republic, Inc., 1929}, p. 54. This and another 
passage in Dewey's work (Ibid., pp. 81-82.) deserve more extended 
treatment than I can give them here. 
Soviet education at the community level did appeal to Dewey 
for a period of time. although even initially he d istrusted Soviet 
ideology and was not certain aboufv 1hat might happen when the 
ideology came more direc tly to bear on communal practices. Ibid., 
pp. 57·58, 113 ·114, 120 ·123, 7. The appeal is one thing; but, 
again, it i s quite another to const,ue the quoted passage as 
saying that Dewey \vanted or though t desirable an identi fication 
of education and propaganda. It hardly v1ould be consistent \vi th 
his other statements on education to say that its identi fication 
with propaganda, " ha d appeal." See, for example, John Dewey, 
Character and Events, ed. bY Joseph Ratner (New York: Henry 
Holt, 1929), Vol. 11 , pp. 517·521, 587·591, 776-781; and his The 
Problems of Men (New York: Philosophica l Library, 1946, pp. 37. 
38, 56 , 82. 
Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., use the same quotation 
{with the same errof) in another work, introducing the quotation 
with: "Oev1ey's essentially laudatory description o f Soviet 
education is perhaps Indicative o f his more general attitude about 
socia l control. " At leas t equally, " Perhaps not," I think we can 
reply. Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., Work, Tech· 
nology, and Education, p. 74. 
One other point must suffice for this brief paper. Feinberg 
w rites: 
One of the schools that Oev1ey reported on in the lat· 
ter part of the book (Schools of Tomorrow) was 
P.S. 26 in India napolis. P.S. 26 was an all·black school 
i n a poor black s lum. In vie\v of the condition of 
the families in the neighborhood and the poverty 
that Dewey described. the school \Vas carryi ng on 
some v1orthwhile programs and \vaS rightly inc luded. 
Oev1ey mentioned that the scho ol was located i n ·' the 
crov
1ded 
distric t o f the c ity and has only colored 
pupils /' and he observed t hat the school was not at· 
tempting to solve the race problem but that i t v1as 
developing good citiiens. If the experiment were to 
succeed, it would "mean a real step forward in 
solving the race problem." Yet the program that 
Dewey then described v1as strictly a vocationa l 
program
, a
lbeit an excellent one v1here much of the 
school and the neighborhood served as a shop for the 
students. At a time \'/hen much black labor was un· 
skilled or employe-d as farmhands, a program of skill 
development v1as an advance torv1ard. Nevertheless. 
black boys learned how to cook and black girls how 
to sew. 
It mighl be said in the context of the purpose of the 
Deweys' book that it is unfair to cr iticize Oe\vey for 
merely reporting on \Vhat ~·as a splendid vocat ional 
program wi thout commenting on the social con· 
ditions that made being a cook one of the highest 
aspirations of a Negro child. Yet in vie~· of the 
some\vhat m ild, but nevertheless serious, criticism 
[that the Oe\veys made elsewhere in School and 
Society) of Montessori, It v1ould not have been too 
much to expect a comment on t he implicat ions of a 
strictly vocational program for black childr en. A more 
serious shadov1 Is cast over Dewey's evaluation of 
the exper iment as he suggests Its greatest valu e to 
lie among the youngsters of Negro and immigrant 
parents. If it was real ism that guided Oev1ey's at · 
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titude, it \Vas realism of a peculiar kind. one that 
believed that the best way for a black man to cope 
wi1h American society v1as to fit into it as best he 
could and as best it would allov1 . Ibi d., p. 110. 
Let us look at the lar ger section from Schools of Tomorrow. I have 
added italics. 
8 
The supervising principal of public school No. 26 in 
Indianapolis is trying an experiment unlike any other 
knov1n to us in an effort to make his plant a true 
school; that is, a place where the children of his 
neighborhood shall become healthy, happy, and com· 
petent both economically and socially, and where the 
connection of instruction v1i th the life of the com· 
munity shall be dir ectly re cognized both by children 
and parents. Mr. Valetin e•s school is locate d in the 
poor, crov1ded, color ed distric t of the city and has 
only colored pupils . It is not an attempt to solve the 
"race questio n" or yet an experiment suited only to 
corored people. There is nothing in the school not en. 
tirely practical In any district where the children 
come from homes with limited rosources and meager 
surroundings. A visitor, when leaving his school, can· 
not fail to wish that such ventures might be started Jn 
all our great cities-indeed in any community where 
people need to be aroused to a sense of their needs, 
including the fact that it they are to contribute to the 
best interests of the community, they must be taught 
how to earn a living, and how to use their resources 
for th$mselves and their neighbors both in leisure 
time and in working hours. Mr. Valentin e's school ls a
school for color ed Chi ldren only in the sense that the 
work has been arranged in relatio n to the conditions 
of the neighborhood; these modify the needs of the 
particular ch ildren v1ho are the pupi ls. Yet the suc-
cess of the exper iment would mean a real step tor-
\Vard to solving the "race question" and pecul iar 
problems of any immigrant d istrict as well. Mr. Valen-
tine is not Interested in illus trating any theories on 
these points, but in making up for gaps in the home 
life of the pupils; giving them opportunities to 
prepare for a better future~ in supplying plenty of 
healt hy occupation and recreation; and in seeing to it 
that their schoolwork reacts at once to improve 
neighborhood condi tions. 
Mr. Valentine's sch ool Is re a ly a social settlement 
for the neighborhood, but it has a decided advantage 
over the average settlement, for it comes in contact 
v1ith all the chi ldren living within its district for a num· 
ber of hours each day, whi le most settlements reach 
the children for only a fe\v scattered hours each 
week. The school has a larger influence than most 
settlements because it is a public institution tor 
v1hich the people \vho use it are paying their -share: 
they feel that their relation to it is a business one. 
not a matter of philanthropy. Because of this busi· 
nessl!ke relation the school is able really to teach 
the doctrines of social welfare. In any setllement the 
\vork is al\vays handicapped by the fact t hat the 
people who make use of It feel that they are receiving 
something for \Vhich they do not pay, that something 
is being done for them by people who are better off 
financially than they are. But 9 ivin9 a community 
facilities that it lacks for special c lasses and rec· 
reation through the publ ic school of the dlsttict 
put the \VOrk on a different basis. The school is really 
the property of the people o f the district: they feel 
that they are more or less responsible for what is 
done there. Any wider activities that a school may un· 
dertake are, to a cerlain extent, the \vork of the 
people themeselves; they are simply making use of 
the school plant for their own needs. 
John and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, pp. t5H52. My 
italics. (Feinberg•s reference is top. 207 of this work, v1hich I think 
must be Incorrect.) One can say that Dewey refers ~pecially to 
youngsters of Negro and immigrant parents; but is i t not equally 
or more correct to say that he refers especially to "any district 
where the children come from ho1nes w ith limited resources and 
meager surroundings"? And, does the fuller passage indicate that 
Dewey is unmoved by a deep concern for all such children? 
I venture that Feinberg•s account does not do justice to v1hat 
Dewey's account and context provide. And I single out the 
passage for lengthy treatment because Feinberg, in four other pub-
lications. uses the passage in an almost identical manner. with 
even Jess context (although v1ith reference back to Reason and 
Rhetoric) in at least three of them. See his "Progressive Education 
and Social Planning," pp. 495·496; Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, 
Jr.1 Work, Technology, and Education, p. 90; Feinberg's revie\V, 
"John Dewey: Lectures In China, t919·192o;· publis hed in 
Philosophy East and West, XXV, 4 (Winter 1975), p. 368; and his 
"Educational Equa lity Under Two Confl icting Models o f Educa· 
tional Development," Theory and Society, 2, 2 (Summer, 1975), 
p. 209, ftn. 17. 
The f inal chapter in the Oeweys' Schools of Tomorrow (Chap· 
ter XI. ·· Democracy and Education" ) makes it patently clear that 
they are not in any sense advocating or accepting c lass or racist 
education from the purvi.!w of democracy. Silent (perhaps overly 
" tactful") they are about speci fic situations which would gall or in· 
furiate us today, but they do not equivocate on democratic prin· 
ciples. Perhaps this Is an appropriate place to give one of the 
more moving statements of \Vhat democratic principles required 
for all children: "What the best and wisest parent wants for his 
O\Vn child, that must the community v1ant for all o f its children. 
Any other ideal for our schools is narrow and unlovely; acted 
upon. it destroys our democracy:· John Dewey, The Child and the 
Curriculum and The School and Society, with " Introduct ion" by 
Leonard Garmlchae l (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, t956), p. 7. 
n Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 52·53. 
u Dewey, The Problems of Men, p, 36. 
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